This paper presents a natural generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms to a space of random samples. The representation allows for preferences that exhibit "ambiguity" (or "uncertainty") aversion in a way that is analogous to risk aversion. The recursive representation also satisfies Time Neutrality axiom. That is the decision maker is indifferent as regards to which uncertainty is resolved. This is possible because the early stage of the two-stage lottery representation are derived from preferences over sample data. The implication is that Time Neutrality is satisfied (almost) trivially for samples with non-zero elements. Further, the early stage lottery is undefined for samples with zero elements. The approach does not force the decision maker to have subjective probability beliefs in the case where he or she observes no data.
Introduction
Many economically relevant decisions are made after observing sample data. When the FDA approves a new drug it does so based on empirical evidence from clinical trials involving 3,000 or more patients. When my grandfather placed his weekly bets on the Melbourne horse races, he did so after careful review of the Herald Sun Form Guide which provided detailed information on recent performances of the horses. When my colleagues select their fantasy football roster they do so after observing data on recent performances of the players on their list and other available players. This paper presents a set of axioms for making choices when the decision maker observes sample data providing information on the likely outcome of the choice. The axioms are a natural generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms to "small" samples. The paper shows that these axioms imply a utility representation that nests an expected utility representation, allowing expected utility over certainty equivalents. Moreover, the representation allows ambiguity (or uncertainty) aversion to be represented in a way that is analogous to standard representations of risk aversion.
The results presented below contrast to the result presented in Grant et al. (2000) . In particular, the paper presents a utility representation that satisfies first-order stochastic dominance, Segal's Time Neutrality axiom (the decision maker is indifferent about which uncertainty is resolved) (Segal (1990) ), can be represented recursively and can represent ambiguity aversion analogously to risk aversion. This is possible because the approach derives the two-stage lottery representation of Grant et al. (2000) from preferences over samples. This leads to two important departures from Grant et al. (2000) . First, because the probabilities in the early stage lottery are generated from the data they cannot be arbitrarily assigned. The implication is that for any positive amount of sample data Segal's Time Neutrality axiom holds (almost) trivially. Second, the axioms do not force the decision maker to hold early stage probability beliefs when the decision maker observes no data. That is, Segal's Time Neutrality axiom holds trivially for all samples. Gilboa et al. (2007) argue that Savage's axioms do not imply rational-ity and are not implied by rationality. In particular the authors argue that "while it is irrational to be agnostic and ignore evidence, it may also be irrational to hold probabilistic beliefs that are not grounded in evidence and are therefore arbitrary." (p. 8) This paper shows that by allowing the decision maker not to have probabilistic beliefs in the situation where he observes no information we can resolve Grant et al. (2000) 's negative result and allow a utility representation that has many "nice" features. Gilboa et al. (2007) also call for more analysis of how beliefs are formed. This paper provides results that move in that direction by showing how axioms over sample data lead the decision maker to construct early stage probability beliefs. The modern approach to modeling decision making under uncertainty dates to von Neumman and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) . This approach is probably one of the most well accepted models of decision making under uncertainty. However, the approach suffers from two major problems. First, the authors explicitly rule out decision making when samples sizes are small. Probability has often been visualized as a subjective concept more or less in the nature of an estimation. Since we propose to use it in constructing an individual, numerical estimation of utility, the above view of probability would not serve our purpose. The simplest procedure is, therefore, to insist upon the alternative, perfectly well founded interpretation of probability as frequency in long runs.
While this assumption has the advantage of making it clear what exactly the authors mean by uncertainty, it has the disadvantage of ruling out many decision making situations. The second problem is known as the "Allais Paradox". The Allais Paradox and related laboratory results indicate that actual decision makers systematically vary from von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms, particularly in regards to events at the extremes of the distribution. This paper solves the first problem by generalizing von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms to samples in the "short run". However, it does not directly take on the second problem because von Neumman and Morgenstern expected utility still holds in the long run. That said, "over weighting" small observed frequencies is in fact "rational" and consistent with the axioms presented in this paper when samples sizes are small.
1
Savage (and others) (Savage (1954) ) have also presented solution to the first problem with the von Neumann and Morgenstern representation. Savage presents a set of axioms that imply "subjective" probability beliefs on events and an expected utility representation. This approach has the advantage of being substantially more applicable than the von Neumann and Morgenstern approach. But has the disadvantage of implying choices that many actual decision makers would not make (Ellsberg (1961) ). By generalizing expected utility to situations where decision makers may not have access to frequencies in the long run, Savage may have solved one problem and created another.
Various researchers have attempted to find a set of axioms and a utility representation that are consistent with ideas of "rationality" but allow the types of choices suggested by Allais or Ellsberg or both. One approach is to relax the "independence axiom", i.e. A B ⇔ A ∪ C B ∪ C. Consider the following situation. The decision maker can choose A and knows that if A is chosen there will be a coin toss where a Head pays $100 and the probability of a head is .5. Alternatively the decision maker can choose B and knows that there are two coins, one that whose probability of head is .25 and one whose probability of head is .75. However, the decision maker does not know which coin will be chosen. Again a Head pays $100. While the decision maker does not know which coin will be chosen in B the idea of placing a probability of .5 on the .25 probability of Head and .5 probability on the .75 probability of Head seems reasonable.
2 If some sort of independence axiom holds (such 1 If a decision maker observes a sample with 1 head and 99 tails then the likelihood distribution (as defined below) on the actual probability of heads is skewed. That is, the likelihood that the actual probability of a head is 0.015 is greater than the likelihood that the actual probability of a head is 0.005. The representation presented here uses these likelihoods to weight the expected utility, thus over-weighting higher probabilities. This suggests that Allais type choices may be due to a misunderstanding of where the probabilities are coming from. 2 Note this is not required by the Savage axioms, I'm just assuming it for illustrative purposes.
as reduction of compound lotteries axiom) (Segal (1990) ) then the expected utility of the two choices is the same. Many have a hard time accepting that a rational person should be indifferent between A and B. Given such choices many people choose A, suggesting some aversion to the "uncertainty" or "ambiguity" associated with not knowing which coin will be chosen. Some authors have suggested using the idea of "two-stage lotteries" to represent this uncertainty of which lottery is true, i.e. there is a lottery over lotteries. For example Klibanoff et al. (2005) present such a model and show how ambiguity aversion can be modeled in a way that is analogous to risk aversion. However, there has been difficulty finding utility representation that satisfies all of the following:
• Monotonicity or a preference for stochastic dominating lotteries.
• Adding up or probabilistic sophistication.
• Time Neutrality or indifference to which uncertainty is resolved.
• Allow ambiguity or uncertainty aversion.
• Have a nice representation such as Recursive Non-Expected Utility.
In fact, Grant et al. (2000) present the following negative result. "Loosely speaking, to escape the recursive expected utility model, either (a) the agent's within-stage preference must fail to conform to either the betweenness or the rank-dependence model; or (b) she must be quite inconsistent in her preferences for early or late resolution; or (c) she must violate recursivity." So, while the representation presented in Klibanoff et al. (2005) has a lot of nice properties it does not satisfy Segal's Time Neutrality axiom. This axiom states that the decision maker should be indifferent between the choice A presented above and a variation on B in which one coin has two heads, the other coin has two tails and the probability that the two-headed coin is chosen is known to be .5. A decision maker satisfies this axiom if she is indifferent about the which uncertainty is resolved. In the example, if the decision maker chooses A she knows the probability of $100 is .5, while with B she knows the probability of the coin choice, but once the coin is chosen she knows with certainty whether she will win $100 or $0. Under Time Neutrality, the decision maker is indifferent between A and B.
Below it is shown that when the two-stage lottery representation is derived from sample data, utility can be represented ala Klibanoff et al. (2005) and the Segal's Time Neutrality axiom is satisfied trivially (in the mathematical sense of the word). To see this, consider an example where B is changed slightly such that the decision maker no longer knows the probability with which the two-headed coin will be chosen. Instead, the decision maker is given some sample data on coin tosses from choice B. Note such information instantly reveals which coin is being used. Observing a single Head tells the decision maker that the two-headed coin has been chosen. Thus, with sample data it is not possible to have non-zero probability beliefs on both the two-headed coin and the two-tailed coin. Resolving uncertainty at the later stage resolves uncertainty at the earlier stage. The exception is when no data is available. The two stage lottery representation used in this paper is not defined when no data is observed.
The one utility representation that is not discussed very much in relation to decision making uncertainty is the utility representation due to Debreu (1954) . Debreu presents an axiomatic approach to a continuous real-valued utility representation. This approach holds irrespective of whether the decision maker has preferences over guns and butter, cars, or lotteries. Theorem 1, below, shows that it also holds for sample data. The advantage of this approach is that the requirements on "rationality" are minimalist. The approach simply requires the decision maker have a complete ordering, that is any two samples can be ordered in the preference relation, transitivity holds and there is some type of "continuity". The disadvantage is that it allows choices that may be "irrational" at least according to some definitions of rationality.
Econometricians have presented two alternative approaches to decision making over data samples; classical and Bayesian. The modern classical approach gives us the Analogy Principle (Goldberger (1991) ). The Analogy Principle states that when making decisions based on short run frequencies (sample data) the decision maker should use the analogy in the sample of what the same decision maker would use if making decision using long run frequencies (population data). For example, if the decision maker prefers the choice with the higher expected return in the long run (the higher population mean), then the decision maker should prefer the sample with the higher sample average.
3 Classical statistics allows the decision maker to have some concern about the accuracy of the sample analog as an estimate of the population characteristic. Traditionally, Hypothesis Testing has used cutoff of 5 % or 10 % of "confidence" to provide an incomplete ordering based on the sample analog and the accuracy of that estimate. More modern treatments allow for a complete ordering by using the "p-value" instead of the arbitrary cutoff. Measures of accuracy either come from assumptions about the distribution for the sample analog for large samples or using the sample analog of the distribution to determine the distribution of the sample analog of the characteristic of interest (or "bootstrapping"). Bayesian statistics (somewhat) follows the Savage tradition by assuming the decision maker has initial probabilistic beliefs and updates those beliefs using Bayes' Rule after observing the sample data. Generally, accuracy is accounted for by allowing "diverse" priors. Bayesians also use hypothesis tests to provide an ordering over samples. This paper presents a utility representation that follows the Analogy Principle by using the sample analog of the von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility representation. Accuracy is accounted for by using the idea of a likelihood function. This likelihood weight is transformed into a probability weight by dividing by all possible likelihood weights for a given sample.
While decision making over sample data is a generalization of the situation presented in von Neumann and Morgenstern, it is still a lot less general than the situation presented in Savage and probably a lot less general than we may want (see Gilboa et al. (2010) for a discussion of various situations of uncertainty). That said, the restriction to random samples has the advantage of providing a concrete and well understood example of uncertainty (or ambiguity). It is hoped that this more structured environment provides a means for understanding how the information environment affects the utility representation.
It should be noted that the utility representation below is on the space of samples (a vector of observed outcomes). This is a departure from the modern practice of using the space of "acts" or bets. That is, the space of functions from the set of states to the set of outcomes. The reason for the departure from modern practice is that it allows a parsimonious presentation. Moreover, the space of samples is analogous to the space of lotteries. Of course, the space of samples of outcomes is directly related to the space of states and acts. In particular, if we observe a sample of states and we know the act, then we can construct the sample of observed outcomes. Now, it is also possible that we observe a sample of "events" rather than states, where an event is a subset of the state space. If we dont know how a particular act maps from events to outcomes, we cannot construct the corresponding sample of outcomes. While this is an interesting issue, it is beyond the scope of this paper and here it is assumed that the corresponding sample of outcomes is the null set.
Lastly, the paper skirts the question of decision making when the sample is the null set. This issue is of obvious importance, see Ellsberg for example, however the issue has been discussed in detail in the decision making literature (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) ) and the econometrics literature (Manski (1990) ) and this paper does not add to those discussions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the axioms, assumptions and notation of the model. Section 3 presents the three representation theorems, the first is due to Debreu (1954) , the second is due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and the third is new. Section 4 discusses the main result, comparing it to other representations and axioms that have been discussed in the literature.
Model and Axioms

Model
This section presents the notation and basic assumptions about the model of decision making under uncertainty to be discussed in this paper.
Let there exist a set of outcomes X, where X is countably dense (separable). Let x i ∈ X denote an element of X. The assumption that the outcome space is countably dense is not intuitive but a necessary technical assumption for using one of the theorems presented in Debreu (1954) . Technically it says that there is a subset of X that is countable, call it Z and the closure of Z is X. Very loosely, you can always find a member of Z in any subset of X. Note that is countably dense because the closure of the Rationals is .
There exists some probability distribution p ∈ P where p : X → [0, 1] and p(x) = 1. Let P be the set of all such distributions, P = {p :
Let A denote some sample of data of size
where x i ∈ X and N A ∈ N. Let A denote the set of all such samples.
A is the space of random samples. To be clear, this set includes the empty set ({∅}). Let D denote the "data generating process". This a function
That is D(p(x i ), N A ) = A. It will be assumed through out the paper that D is random sampling. That is, each x i ∈ A is independently and identically distributed. By the Law of Large Numbers
where Y ⊂ X, 1|.| is the indicator function and convergence is in probability (Greene (1997) Theorem 6.14) or almost surely (CITE). 4 Let
and let
We say that F A is the sample analog of F . From above we see that F A converges almost surely to F as N A goes to ∞. Also, as N A goes to ∞, Pr(F A = F ) = 1. Let r(F |A) denote the probability that the actual probability distribution is F given the sample A, r(F |A) = Pr(
Let there be a sequence Y N such that each element of Y T is a strict non-empty subset of Y T −1 . We can use this to define r(p|A).
where
) and s(F ) is the unconditional probability of F . Note if N A = 0, F A is undefined and so r(p|A) is undefined, although s(F ) is not undefined.
Axioms
This subsection presents the five main axioms for decision making given random sample data. These axioms generalize the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms to a space of small random samples. Let and denote a preference ordering on A, where A B ∀A, B ∈ A means A is strictly 4 Note that result can be seen by translating the sample analog and the population characteristic into the Bernoulli distribution. Thank you to Jesse Leary for reminding me of this result. In conjunction with the assumption that the outcome space X is countably dense, these three axioms allow a real valued continuous utility representation on A (Debreu (1954) ). Note there are various axioms and assumption that allow such a representation (CITES).
The last two axioms are versions of the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms that imply the expected utility representation. As with von Neumann and Morgenstern these axioms hold for the subset of A where the sample size is large. Let A 1 ⊂ A be such that ∀A ∈ A 1 , ∃p ∈ P s.t.
The set A 1 is the set of long run samples. It is the set of samples where the number of observations are so large as to admit little uncertainty about which probability distribution is true, i.e. which probability distribution generated the sample data.
Axiom 4 Frequencies in the Long
Run If A, B ∈ A 1 and f A (x) = f B (x) then A ∼ B.
Axiom 5 Independence in the Long
Axiom 4 states that in the long run all that matters is the frequency of the outcomes and the outcomes themselves. So for example, sample size is irrelevant to the decision maker in the long run. Axiom 5 is a version of von Neumann and Morgenstern (mixture) independence axiom. This axiom gives the utility representation its expected utility character. Given this, the axioms presented generate an expected utility representation at least in the long run. Below, it is shown that these axioms lead to a expected utility over certainty equivalent representation in the short run.
Results
This section presents the main utility representation results. The first result is due to Debreu (1954) and states there exists a real valued continuous utility representation. The second result formally shows that the von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility represents preferences on the A-1 subset of A. The third result shows that preferences over samples can be represented by an expected utility over certainty equivalents.
Before presenting the main results it is necessary to do a little housework to make the exposition of the first result clearer. The following technical result is necessary for Debreu's result to go through for the space of sample data.
Lemma 1 A is countably dense.
Proof Let A ⊂ A and let A be the closure of A in A. Note A = A ∩ A. By assumption X is countably dense. By assumption A = N ∈N Π N i=1 X ∪ {∅}. X is a subspace of A under . As X is countably dense there exists a countable set Z ⊂ X s.t. (Munkres (1975) Theorem 7.5) .
Π Munkres (1975) , p. 116). As (Munkres (1975) , Theorem 7.4). Munkres (1975) , p. 100). N ∈N Z N ⊂ A (see note above).
Given A is countably dense the proof of the next result follows in a straightforward fashion.
Theorem 1 (Debreu (1954) ) Given X is countably dense and Axioms (1) - (3)
where U is continuous.
Proof. Debreu (1954) 's Theorem I requires {A, } is 1. Completely ordered.
Countably dense (separable).
3. Connected.
4. ∀A ∈ A, {A ∈ A|A A } and {A ∈ A|A A} are closed.
The proof is in four steps, one for each condition.
Step 1. A complete ordering is defined by Axiom (1) and (2) (CITE P.160 OF DRAFT).
Step 2. By assumption X is countably dense. By Lemma (1), A is countably dense.
Step 3. A is connected if there does not exists a pair of disjoint open sets U, V ⊂ A such that U ∪ V = A. Suppose not. Let A be such that U = {A ∈ A|A ≺ A}, and V = {A ∈ A|A ≺ A } U,V are open in {A, }, U and V are disjoint, let u ∈ U and v ∈ V. So u ≺ v. By Axiom (3), ∃C ∈ A s.t. u ≺ C ≺ v. As u and v are arbitrary, C / ∈ U and C / ∈ V, so C / ∈ U ∪ V, so U ∪ V = A. A contradiction.
Step 4. A−{A ∈ A|A A } = {A ∈ A|A ≺ A}. As this set is open in A ( Munkres (1975) , p. 86) given the standard order topology, {A ∈ A|A A } is closed (p. 92). Similarly for {A ∈ A|A A}. Q.E.D.
Theorem (1) states that there exists a utility representation over samples. It is doesn't tell us what it looks like, but it is good to know that it exists and the requirements for existence are modest. It is important to note that the expected utility representation and other assumptions in decision making under uncertainty are not necessary for the existence of a continuous utility representation.
The next result shows that the axioms admit the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation, albeit for a subspace of A.
Theorem 2 (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)) Given X is countably dense and Axioms (1) 
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. The first step invokes the result from Theorem (1). The second step shows v exists for a subset of A 1 . The third step shows that the utility representation has the expected utility form.
Step 1. As X is countably dense and given Axioms (1) - (3), by Theorem
Step 2. Let
where f B (y) = 1 and v is continuous.
Step 3. Consider the subset A 1 s.t. each sample only has 3 outcomes x, y, z ∈ X. By Axiom (4),
So g(p, x; q, y;
and h 2 > 0, h(1, v(x)) = v(x) and h(0, v(x)) = 0. By continuity of g.
s.t. g > 0, g(p) → 1 as p → 1, and g(p) → 0 as p → 0.
Theorem (2) gives the result that we have a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation for known lotteries. The next result generalizes the von Neumann-Morgenstern representation to a broader set of situations but without the baggage associated with the Savage axioms. 
for all A ∈ A\{∅} and U ({∅}) = U ∅ ∈ .
Proof. The proof proceeds in 4 steps. The first step uses Theorem 1 to show that such a U exists. The second step uses Theorem 2 to show that a v exists. The third step argues that all that matters is r(p|A), p(x) and the set of outcomes, and U has the expected utility of certainty equivalents form. The final step shows the U ({∅}) does not have the expected utility form.
Step 1. Given X is countably dense and Axioms (1) - (3), by Theorem (1), ∃U : A → that is continuous.
Step 2. Given X is countably dense and Axioms (1) -(5), then if A ∈ A 1 ⊂ A, by Theorem (2)
Note that for an h s.t. h > 0
for any A, B ∈ A 1 ⊂ A.
Step 3. Consider the case where there are just two "true" distributions, p and q. Let r denote the probability of p given the sample. From Theorem 2, if r = 1,
and by continuity (Theorem 1),
where p denotes the RHS of equation 16. That is, U (A) cannot be a function of characteristics of A other than r, p and q. Moreover,
If p = q then by Axiom 4 we have that k(r) + k(1 − r) = 1 for all r and so we have the result.
Step 4. By Step (1) U ({∅}) ∈ . By definition r(p|{0}) is undefined. Q.E.D.
Theorem (3) shows that given Axioms (1) -(5) which generalize the original von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms to the space of samples, the utility representation generalizes von Neumann and Morgenstern's expected utility to expected utility on certainty equivalents. The next section discusses the relationship between this utility representation and utility representations over two-stage lottery spaces.
Discussion
A number of researchers have proposed representing decision making under uncertainty with axioms over two-stage lotteries (Klibanoff et al. (2005) for example). One idea is to assume that the late-stage lottery is the objective or known lottery in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern's frequencies in the long run, while the early stage is a lottery over lotteries where the probabilities are subjective in the sense of Savage (for example).
To illustrate the idea, consider two objective lotteries {p, x; 1 − p, y} and {q, x; 1 − q, y}, where x and y are outcomes and p and q are probabilities (Pr(x) = p). The two-stage lottery is
where s is the subjective probability that the actual lottery is p. Given such a space, Segal (1990) suggests the following axiom.
It has also been suggested that a nice utility representation over two-stage lotteries is the recursive representation.
Further, Klibanoff et al. (2005) suggests that the shape of h can be used to represent ambiguity aversion in way that is analogous to the standard representations of risk aversion. For example if h < 0 the decision maker would be ambiguity averse. Unfortunately, Grant et al. (2000) presents a result that says it is not possible to have Time Neutrality and represent ambiguity aversion in this way. To see this, note that Axiom (6) implies
which implies h = 0. So does the representation presented in Theorem (3) suffer a similar fate? No. There are two reasons for this.
First, if there are two certain long run lotteries then for any sample with a non-zero number of elements, the conditional probability of the certain lottery given the sample is either 1 or 0. It is not possible to place positive likelihoods on two different certain events after observing data. The only r(p|A) that satisfies the situation described in Axiom (6) is r(p|A) = 1. That is {1, {1, x}} ∼ {1, {1, x}}
which is trivially satisfied by the representation presented in Theorem (3). Second, the representation in Theorem (3) does not force a two-stage lottery representation for the empty set. In fact, the early stage lottery is undefined for the empty set. If this was not true and there did exist a two-stage lottery representation for the empty set then the only way to satisfy Time Neutrality would be for h = 0. This occurs because the first argument only holds for samples with a non-zero number of elements. A more general criticism of the two-stage lottery approach to uncertainty aversion, particularly the representation presented in Klibanoff et al. (2005) , is that there is no qualitative difference between the probabilities in the two stages (Epstein (2010) ). To some extent the argument in this paper is consistent with that criticism. Here the probabilities in the two stages are qualitatively different. In particular, the latter stage probabilities are "objective" probabilities. They are equivalent of von Neumann and Morgensterns idea of frequencies in the long run, or what econometricians call the population values. These probabilities are "true" (or false) statements about the world. They are fixed. The early stage probabilities are not fixed. They are explicit functions of the information available to the decision maker. They change as the decision maker learns more about the world.
Should decision makers treat these probabilities differently? In the practice of economics, we certainly do treat them differently. In almost any empirical paper the authors present the early stage probabilities, the parameter estimates, separately from the late stage probabilities, the standard errors of the parameter estimates. Moreover, the authors discuss them differently (or should), using "economic significance" to discuss the parameter estimate and "statistical significance" to discuss the standard errors of the parameter estimates.
Conclusion
This paper considers a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility framework to the case where decision makers observe short run frequencies, i.e. sample data. The axioms presented here correspond to the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms in the long run. It is shown that these axioms infer a utility representation which is recursive in the sense that there is expected utility over certainty equivalents. Importantly, the representation does not require the decision maker to have subjective probability beliefs when the decision maker has no information with which to make an inference.
It is shown that the representation satisfies Segal's Time Neutrality axiom while allowing a recursive representation in which ambiguity aversion can be represented analogously to risk aversion (Klibanoff et al. (2005) ). That is, for decision making over random samples, the negative result presented in Grant et al. (2000) does not hold. This is possible because the early stage of the lottery is not arbitrarily defined, rather it is a function of the sample data. Further, no early stage lottery is defined for the empty set. This is consistent with Gilboa et al. (2007) who suggest that it may be irrational for a decision maker to have probabilistic beliefs when no information is available.
